

TOP SECRET

Tactical & National

18 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer
for General Purpose Forces

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Soviet Naval Readiness Study

25X1 1. When we first got close to putting out the study on Soviet Naval Readiness, I had hopes that we might be able to get the Navy to give this reasonably wide distribution. It is the kind of thing young Naval officers ought to be exposed to, but are not. There are still two problems in trying to get the Navy to give it any further distribution: one is classification; the other is politics.

2. Would you look at whether we could:

- a. Drop the Executive Summary;
- b. Sanitize the main body of the report to SECRET or TOP SECRET at the highest;
- c. Take out of the main body any material the Navy would find offensive about whether the Soviets can carry out their wartime responsibilities;
- d. Then look at the product and see whether it is possible we could persuade the Navy that this would be good material for its troops to read.

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